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This paper studies how reciprocity and inequity aversion inﬂuence the be-
havior of ﬁrms in imperfectly competitive markets. The paper shows that if
reciprocal ﬁrms compete à la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive”
outcomes under a positive reciprocity equilibrium. By contrast, Stackelberg war-
fare outcomes may emerge under a negative reciprocity equilibrium. The results
for inequity aversion are similar. Cournot competition between inequity averse
ﬁrms can be harmful to consumers if it leads to equilibria where ﬁrms feel com-
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are envious of each other consumers are better oﬀ than if ﬁrms were selﬁsh. The
paper also shows that only under very restrictive conditions does reciprocity or
inequity aversion have an impact on Bertrand competition. Finally, the paper
shows that non-selﬁsh preferences have a greater impact on equilibrium out-
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Many experiments show that individuals are not only motivated by material self-
interest, but also care about the well-being and the intentions of others. Some
experiments show that many individuals are willing to incur losses to punish
those who treat them unkindly or to reward those who treat them kindly. This
type of behavior is called preferences for reciprocity. Other experiments ﬁnd
that many individuals are willing to give up some material payoﬀ to move in
the direction of more equitable distributions of payoﬀs. This type of behavior
is called inequity aversion.1
Preferences for reciprocity and inequity aversion have been shown to explain
behavior in bargaining games and in trust games.2 For example, in ultimatum
games oﬀers are usually much more generous than predicted by equilibrium and
low oﬀers are often rejected. These oﬀers are consistent with an equilibrium
in which players make oﬀers knowing that other players may reject allocations
that appear unfair.3
The impact of non-selﬁsh preferences on strategic interactions between ﬁrms
has not received much attention.4 The only exceptions are Bolton and Ock-
enfels (2000) and Santos-Pinto (2006). Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) ﬁnd that
of inequity aversion has no impact on Cournot and Bertrand competition.5
Santos-Pinto (2006) shows that inequity aversion is able to organize most of the
experimental evidence on endogenous timing games.6 This happens because
inequity aversion makes symmetric outcomes more attractive to players than
asymmetric outcomes.
The paper starts by extending the Cournot model of quantity competition
by incorporating preferences for reciprocity. We assume that a reciprocal ﬁrm
cares about its own material payoﬀ but also about the intentions of its rivals. If a
reciprocal ﬁrm expects the output of its rivals to fall short of its own perception
of their fair output, then the ﬁrm is willing to sacriﬁce some of its material
payoﬀ to increase its rivals’ material payoﬀs. This assumption captures positive
1Some individuals also display altruism and others spitefulness. This paper does not study
the impact of altruism and spitefulness on oligopolistic competition.
2Camerer (2003) and Sobel (2005) provide reviews of this literature.
3Economists have also began to study the implications of non-selﬁsh preferences in optimal
contracts. For example, Englmaier and Wambach (2002) study optimal contracts when the
agent suﬀers from being better oﬀ or worse oﬀ than the principal. Biel (2003) studies how the
optimal incentive contract in team production is aﬀe c t e dw h e nw o r k e r sa r ea v e r s et oi n e q u i t y .
Sappington (2004) studies inequity aversion in adverse selection contexts.
4The impact of non-selﬁsh preferences on perfectly competitive markets has been considered
in several studies. Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) show how the
competitive prediction of the ultimatum game with many proposers and one responder studied
by Prasnikar and Roth (1992) continues to hold under the assumption that some individuals in
the population care about inequity aversion. Segal and Sobel (2004) show that interdependent
preferences have no impact on equilibrium outcomes of perfectly competitive markets.
5We discuss their ﬁndings in Section 5.
6The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most
frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate
this prediction empirically, but failed to ﬁnd support for it. By contrast, the experiments ﬁnd
that simultaneous-move symmetric outcomes are modal.
2reciprocity. By contrast, if a reciprocal ﬁrm expects its rivals to produce more
than its own perception of their fair output, then the ﬁrm is willing to sacriﬁce
some of its material payoﬀ to reduce its rivals’ material payoﬀs. This assumption
captures negative reciprocity. Preferences of ﬁrms are assumed to be common
knowledge.
The main result in the paper, Theorem 1, shows how reciprocal ﬁrms’ per-
ceptions of the fair output of their rivals change the outcome of Cournot compe-
tition. The result shows that if the weight of preferences for reciprocity in ﬁrms’
payoﬀ functions is not too excessive and the marginal returns from increasing
production are decreasing with ﬁrms’ perceptions of the fair output of their ri-
vals, then the higher are ﬁrms’ perceptions of the fair output of their rivals the
lower will be the set of Cournot-Nash equilibria.
Next, the paper states three results that compare the equilibrium outcome
of Cournot competition with selﬁsh ﬁrms to that of Cournot competition with
reciprocal ﬁrms. The ﬁrst result, Proposition 1, shows that if reciprocal ﬁrms
perceive the fair output of their rivals to be equal to the equilibrium output that
the rivals would produce in the game with selﬁsh ﬁrms, then they will produce
t h es a m eq u a n t i t i e sa ss e l ﬁsh ﬁrms. In this case reciprocity shifts the ﬁrms’ best
replies (by comparison with the best replies of selﬁsh ﬁrms) but does not change
the equilibrium of the game.
The second result, Proposition 2, shows that if reciprocal ﬁrms compete à
la Cournot, then they are able to sustain “collusive” outcomes under a pos-
itive reciprocity equilibrium.7 By a positive reciprocity equilibrium we mean
a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where ﬁrms feel positive reciprocity towards their
rivals. A positive reciprocity equilibrium happens whenever reciprocal ﬁrms
perceive the fair output of their rivals to be greater than the equilibrium output
that the rivals would produce in a game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. In a positive reci-
procity equilibrium the rivals of a ﬁrm produce less than the ﬁrm’s perception
of the fair output of the rivals. In such an equilibrium a reciprocal ﬁrm produce
less than a selﬁsh ﬁrm in order to reward its rivals for producing less than its
perception of the fair output level of its rivals. A positive reciprocity equilibrium
is good for ﬁrms since it increases ﬁrms’ material payoﬀs (by comparison with
the material payoﬀ of selﬁsh ﬁrms) and provides ﬁrms’ some payoﬀ gains from
positive reciprocity. A positive reciprocity equilibrium is bad for consumers
since it leads to collusive outcomes.
Finally, Proposition 3, shows that Stackelberg warfare outcomes may emerge
under a negative reciprocity equilibrium.8 By a negative reciprocity equilibrium
we mean a Cournot-Nash equilibrium where ﬁrms feel negative reciprocity to-
wards their rivals. Such an equilibrium happens whenever reciprocal ﬁrms per-
ceive the fair output of their rivals to be smaller than the equilibrium output
that the rivals would produce in the game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. In a negative reci-
procity equilibrium the rivals of a ﬁrm produce more than the ﬁrm’s perception
7Throughout the paper we consider that collusive outcomes describe situations where re-
ciprocal ﬁrms produce less than the Cournot-Nash quantities of selﬁsh ﬁrms.
8We consider that Stackelberg warfare describes a situation where reciprocal ﬁrms produce
more than the Cournot-Nash outputs of selﬁsh ﬁrms.
3of the fair output of the rivals. In such an equilibrium a reciprocal ﬁrm produces
more than a selﬁsh ﬁrm in order to punish its rivals for producing more than
its perception of the fair output level of its rivals. A negative reciprocity equi-
librium is bad for ﬁrms since it reduces ﬁrms’ material payoﬀs (by comparison
with the material payoﬀ of selﬁsh ﬁrms) and makes ﬁrms incur payoﬀ loses from
negative reciprocity. A negative reciprocity equilibrium is good for consumers
since it leads to Stackelberg warfare outcomes.
The paper proceeds by studying the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot
competition. We assume that an inequity averse ﬁrm cares about its own mon-
etary payoﬀ and, in addition, would like to reduce the diﬀerence between its
payoﬀ and its rivals’ payoﬀs. More speciﬁcally, such a ﬁrm is assumed to dislike
advantageous inequity (it feels compassion) and also to dislike disadvantageous
inequity (it feels envy).9 The paper ﬁnds that the impact of inequity aversion
on Cournot competition is similar to that of preferences for reciprocity.
We also state results that show that the set of Nash equilibria of Cournot
competition when ﬁrms are averse to inequity changes monotonically with com-
passion and envy. If there is quantity competition and ﬁrms’ degree of envy
increases, then the largest Nash equilibria of the Cournot game moves closer to
the perfectly competitive outcome.10 By contrast, if there is quantity competi-
tion and compassion between ﬁrms increases, then the smallest Nash equilibria
of the Cournot game moves closer to the collusive outcome.
Additionally we ﬁnd that piecewise linear inequity aversion between ﬁrms
can give rise to a continuum of symmetric equilibria. The paper also shows
that as the number of ﬁrms grows the impact of piecewise inequity aversion on
the set of Nash equilibria of a n-ﬁrm game vanishes. This happens because it
takes only one selﬁsh ﬁrm to destroy the continuum of equilibria generated by
piecewise linear inequity aversion.
When there is price competition in homogeneous products, then piecewise
linear inequity aversion between ﬁrms either has no impact on the set of equi-
libria or it can raise ﬁrms’ prices. This happens because under Bertrand compe-
tition only compassion between ﬁrms has an impact on equilibrium outcomes.
Envy between ﬁrms has eﬀect on equilibrium outcomes of Bertrand competition
since the lowest equilibrium price, in the absence of inequity aversion, is equal
to marginal cost. Additionally, the paper shows that only under very restric-
tive assumptions on preferences will compassion raise prices under symmetric
Bertrand competition. For example, when there is Bertrand competition be-
tween two ﬁrms and marginal costs are constant, only if both ﬁrms are willing
to give up more than one dollar of their proﬁt to raise the average proﬁto ft h e i r
opponents by a dollar, can there be an equilibrium where price is above marginal
9In this paper a ﬁrm feels compassion towards its rivals when the average material payoﬀ
of its rivals is smaller than a ﬁrm’s own material payoﬀ. Similarly, a ﬁrm fells envy towards
its rivals when the average material payoﬀ o fi t sr i v a l si sg r e a t e rt h a naﬁrm’s own material
payoﬀ.
10A similar result has also been found in a diﬀerent context. Demougin and Fluet (2003)
show that in a rank order tournament the principal is better oﬀ when agents are envious than
when they are compassionate.
4cost.11 This ﬁnding is consistent with previous work on the impact of non-selﬁsh
preferences on perfectly competitive markets. Since the outcome of Bertrand
competition is closer to the perfectly competitive outcome than the outcome of
Cournot competition it is not surprisingly that non-selﬁsh preferences play a
much smaller role in Bertrand competition than in Cournot competition.12
The reminder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the most
important types of non-selﬁsh preferences. Section 3 sets up the model. Sec-
tion 4 studies the impact of preferences for reciprocity on Cournot competition.
Section 5 studies the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot competition. Sec-
tion 6 considers the impact of non-selﬁsh preferences on Bertrand competition.
Section 7 concludes the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2N o n - S e l ﬁsh Preferences
A large number of studies shows that many people are not motivated exclusively
by selﬁsh motives. A person that exhibits non-selﬁsh preferences cares about
the material payoﬀ allocated to her and also about the material payoﬀ or the
intentions of others. Non-selﬁsh preferences have been shown to explain a wide
range of behavior across diﬀerent games.
A particularly important type of non-selﬁsh preferences is the preference
for reciprocity.13 An individual with this type of preferences likes money but
also responds to actions that are perceived to be kind in a kind manner and to
a c t i o n st h a ta r ep e r c e i v e dt ob em e a ni nah a r m f u lm a n n e r . Ap e r s o nw i t ha
preference for reciprocity cares about the intentions behind the actions of their
opponents but is not bothered by unfair payoﬀ distributions. Preferences for
reciprocity were ﬁrst modeled in the economics literature by Rabin (1993) in
the context of static games.14
A second type of non-selﬁsh preferences is inequity aversion. Inequity aver-
sion theories assume that individuals are concerned about their own material
payoﬀ but also the consequences of their acts on payoﬀ distributions. An in-
equity averse person cares about the distribution of payoﬀs but it does not care
about the intentions that lead others to choose certain actions.15 There are two
main theories of inequity aversion: Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000). According to Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model a player cares
about his own payoﬀ and dislikes absolute payoﬀ diﬀerences between his own
payoﬀ and the payoﬀ of any other player.16 According to Bolton and Ockenfels’s
11We show that this result also extends to Bertrand competition between two ﬁrms with
increasing marginal costs.
12Bertrand competition is more competitive than Cournot competition according to the
following criteria: lower mark-up/output ratios, larger average output, and lower average
price.
13Preferences for reciprocity are also called preferences for process or intentions based fair-
ness.
14Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) extended it to dynamic games.
15Inequity aversion is sometimes called preference for outcome based fairness.
16Neilson (2000) provides an axiomatic characterization of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model of inequity aversion.
5(2000) “Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition” (henceforth ERC) a
p l a y e r si sc o n c e r n e dw i t hb o t hh i so w np a y o ﬀ and his relative share of the total
group payoﬀ.17
A third type of non-selﬁsh preferences is pure altruism. An altruistic per-
s o na l w a y sv a l u e sp o s i t i v e l yt h ep a y o ﬀ of the opponents. An altruistic person
is willing to increase the payoﬀ of his opponents at a personal cost to himself,
irrespective of the payoﬀ distribution and irrespective of the behavior of the
opponents. Finally, research also shown that some people exhibit spiteful pref-
erences. A spiteful person always values negatively the payoﬀ of his opponents.
A spiteful person is willing to decrease the payoﬀ of his opponents at a personal
cost to himself, irrespective of the payoﬀ distribution and irrespective of the
behavior of the opponents.
Segal and Sobel (1999) provide an axiomatic foundation for non-selﬁsh pref-
erences that can reﬂect preferences for reciprocity, inequity aversion, altruism as
well spitefulness. They assume that in addition to conventional preferences over
outcomes, players in a strategic environment also have preferences over strategy
proﬁles. Their representation theorem shows that the payoﬀ function of a ﬁrm
with such preferences is of the form
Ui(O(si,s ∗







where si is the strategy of player i, s∗
−i is the strategy that the rest of the
players are playing,u i is the utility from outcomes of player i, uj is the utility
from outcomes of player j 6= i,a n dwij is a coeﬃcient that measures the weight
player i gives to player j’s utility, which is a function of the entire strategy proﬁle.
Positive values of the coeﬃcient wij mean that player i is willing to sacriﬁce his
payoﬀ from outcomes in order to increase the payoﬀ of player j. Negative values
mean that player i is willing to sacriﬁce his payoﬀ from outcomes in order to
lower player j’s payoﬀ.S i n c et h ec o e ﬃcient wij depends on the strategy chosen
by player j, there is scope to model reciprocity. The underlying preferences in
(1) are deﬁned over outcomes. If an outcome speciﬁes a material payoﬀ to each
player, then it is permissible for ui to depend on other players’ material payoﬀs.
Thus, this approach also generalizes the inequity aversion approach.
3R e c i p r o c i t y
Let N = {1,2,...,n} denote the set of ﬁrms. Let price be determined according
to the inverse demand function P(Q), where Q =
P
qi. We make the standard
assumption that P(Q) is strictly positive on some bounded interval (0, ¯ Q) with
P(Q)=0for Q ≥ ¯ Q. W ea l s oa s s u m et h a tP(Q) is strictly decreasing in the
interval for which P(Q) > 0. Firms have costs of production given by Ci(qi).
17According to ERC, a player would be equally happy if all players received the same payoﬀ
or if some were rich and some were poor as long as he received the average payoﬀ, while
according to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) he would clearly prefer that all players get the same.
6Firms costs of production are assumed to be increasing. To incorporate prefer-
ences for reciprocity into the Cournot oligopoly model we use Segal and Sobel














that ﬁrm i places on its rivals aggregate material payoﬀ
P
j6=i πj(qi,Q −i). Firm
i’s material payoﬀ depends on ﬁrm i’s output, qi, and on the aggregate output
of its rivals, Q−i,s u c ht h a t
πi(qi,Q −i)=Ri (qi,Q −i) − Ci(qi),
where Ri(qi,Q −i)=P (Q)qi is the revenue of the ﬁr m . W ea s s u m et h a tt h e
weight ﬁrm i places on its rivals aggregate material payoﬀ depends on ﬁrm i’s
perception of the fair aggregate output of its rivals, QF
−i, and on the aggregate
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that is, ﬁrm i places a positive weight on its rivals aggregate material payoﬀ
when its rivals produce less than QF
−i, ﬁrm i places no weight on its rivals ag-
gregate material payoﬀ when its rivals produce QF
−i,a n dﬁrm i places a negative
weight on its rivals aggregate material payoﬀ when its rivals produce more than
QF
−i. These conditions capture the fact that a ﬁrm with reciprocal preferences
cares about the intentions of its rivals. The ﬁrst condition expresses positive
reciprocity. If ﬁrm i expects the aggregate output of its rivals to fall short of its
own perception of the fair aggregate output of its rivals, then ﬁrm i is willing to
sacriﬁce some of its material payoﬀ to increase its rivals’ material payoﬀs. The
third condition expresses negative reciprocity. When ﬁrm i expects its rivals to
produce more than ﬁrm i’s perception of the fair aggregate output of its rivals,
then ﬁrm i is willing to sacriﬁce some of its material payoﬀ to reduce its rivals’
material payoﬀs.18
We assume throughout that ﬁrms’ preferences for reciprocity as well as per-
ceptions of the fair aggregate of its rivals are common knowledge. The problem
of ﬁrm i is to maximize its payoﬀ function taking the quantities produced by










18Weighting functions that satisfy condition (2) arise naturally. For example,
wi(Q−i,Q F
−i)=α(QF
−i − Q−i),w i(Q−i,Q F
−i)=α(QF








, with α > 0.
7When ﬁrm i has preferences for reciprocity its best reply to Q−i is given by
rR




[P (Q)qj − Cj(qj)].
(3)
Let qF =( QF
−1,Q F
−2,...,Q F
−n) denote the vector of ﬁrms’ perceptions of the
fair aggregate output of their rivals. Let the n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly with
reciprocal ﬁrms be denoted by ΓR(U,w,qF). To begin our analysis we need to
guarantee existence of equilibrium of ΓR(U,w,qF).
There are four types of existence results which may apply to the Cournot
model. The ﬁrst type of result uses the standard existence theorem due to Nash
and shows that every n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly has a Nash equilibrium if each
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is quasiconcave in qi.19
The second type of result, due to Bamon and Frayssé (1985) and Novshek
(1985), shows that every n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly has a Nash equilibrium if each
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ depends on other ﬁrms’ outputs only via their sum and marginal
revenue is a decreasing function of the aggregate output of all other ﬁrms.
The third type of result deals with cases in which the Cournot game is a
supermodular game. Here there are two diﬀerent types of results, one for n =2
and another one for n ≥ 2. Milgrom and Roberts (1990) show that if the natural
order on of one of the ﬁrms’ action sets is reversed, then the Cournot duopoly
is a supermodular game.20 Amir (1996) provides conditions under which the
n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly is a log-supermodular game. However, under these
conditions, best replies are increasing which is not considered to be the “normal”
case in Cournot games.
Finally, Tarsky (1955), McManus (1962, 1964), and Roberts and Sonnen-
schein (1977), show that every n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot oligopoly has a Nash
equilibrium if cost functions are convex.
Our goal is not only to prove existence of equilibria for the Cournot game
with reciprocal ﬁrms but also to state comparative static results. The assump-
tions required to state each of the four existence results imply diﬀerent trade-oﬀs
between generality in existence versus generality in comparative static results.
We decide to focus on the Cournot duopoly case and treat it as a supermodular
game. However, to provide intuition for some of the results we will often use
the n-ﬁrm smooth version of the Cournot oligopoly game with quasiconcave and
diﬀerentiable payoﬀ functions.
Our ﬁrst result guarantees that the Cournot duopoly game with reciprocal
ﬁrms is a supermodular game.
Lemma 1: If n =2and Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i), then
ΓR(U,w,qF) is a supermodular game.
The assumption that the payoﬀ function has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i)
means that the marginal returns to increasing a ﬁrm’s output are lower if the ri-
vals produce a higher output. Note that if ﬁrms are selﬁsh, then the requirement
19This existence result is quite restrictive. See Ch. 4 in Vives (2001).
20This argument breaks down when there are three or more ﬁrms.
8that πi has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i) boils down to the assumption that
the revenue of ﬁrm i has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i). However, if ﬁrms
have preferences for reciprocity, then the requirement that Ui has decreasing
diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i) also implies that the weight that preferences for reci-
procity have on ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ function can not be too large by comparison to
the weight of material payoﬀs. To best way to illustrate this point is to refer to
a smooth version of the n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly game with reciprocal ﬁrms.21
In that game the condition that Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i) is
equivalent to the requirement that ∂2Ui/∂qi∂Q−i < 0 ,t h a ti s
∂2Ui
∂qi∂Q−i










This condition is satisﬁed if the decreasing marginal revenue property holds,
that is, P0(Q)+P00 (Q)qi < 0, and if the impact of a change in rivals’ output
on ﬁrm i’s marginal payoﬀ from preferences for reciprocity is relatively small by










/∂Q−i < |P0(Q)+P00 (Q)qi|.
Thus, if preferences for reciprocity are very important relative to material
payoﬀs, then quantities may be strategic complements over some output ranges
and strategic substitutes over others. If that happens, then we can no longer
use the theory of supermodular games to state general results that characterize
the impact of reciprocity on Cournot competition. Lemma 1 rules out this
possibility.
If ΓR(U,w,qF) is a supermodular game, then it follows from Topkis (1979),
that the equilibrium set is non-empty and has a smallest and a largest pure-
strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium.22 The next result shows how the equilib-
rium set of ΓR(U,w,qF) changes with a change in ﬁrms’ perceptions of the fair
output of their rivals.






, then the smallest and the largest Cournot-
Nash equilibria of ΓR(U,w,qF) are nonincreasing functions of qF.
This result tells us that if ﬁrms have preferences for reciprocity, quantities
are strategic substitutes (the weight of preferences for reciprocity is not too
excessive), and the marginal returns from increasing production are decreasing
with ﬁrms’ perceptions of the fair output of their rivals, then the higher are
21In the smooth version of the n-ﬁrm Cournot oligoply game P(Q) is twice continuously
diﬀerentiable with P0(Q) < 0 (in the interval for which P(Q) > 0) and that the decreasing
marginal revenue property holds, that is, P0(Q)+P00 (Q)qi ≤ 0. Firms costs of production
are assumed to twice continuously diﬀerentiable with C0
i ≥ 0. The function wi(Q−i,Q F
−i) is
assumed to be diﬀerentiable in both arguments with ∂wi/∂Q−i < 0 and ∂wi/∂QF
−i > 0.
22Thes assumption that Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i) guarantees that best
replies are decreasing and this implies existence of equilibrium.
9ﬁrms’ perceptions of the fair output of their rivals the lower will be the set of
Cournot-Nash equilibria.23
The intuition behind this result is straightforward. The assumption that the
payoﬀ function has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q F
−i) means that the larger a
reciprocal ﬁrm perceives the fair output of their rivals to be, the smaller are
the marginal returns from increasing production.24 Thus, an increase in QF
−i
shifts the best reply of a reciprocal ﬁrm i towards the origin. In other words,
the more ﬁrm i perceives the fair output of its rivals to be high, the more ﬁrm
i is willing to produce a smaller output level for any output level of its rivals.
If this happens for every ﬁrm, then the higher are ﬁrms’ perceptions of the fair
output of their rivals the lower will be the set of Cournot-Nash equilibria.
Theorem 1 is a comparative statics result that characterizes the impact that
ﬁrms’ perceptions of the fair output of their rivals have on equilibrium quanti-
ties of Cournot competition among reciprocal ﬁrms. We are also interested in
comparing the outcome of Cournot competition among reciprocal ﬁrms to that
of Cournot competition among selﬁsh ﬁrms. To do that we will compare the
equilibria of game ΓS, the supermodular Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms, to
the equilibria of ΓR, the supermodular Cournot game with reciprocal ﬁrms. We
will assume that these two games are identical in all respects (market demand,
costs, and number of ﬁrms) with the exception of ﬁrms’ preferences. However,
allowing for multiple equilibria makes the comparison cumbersome. Thus, we
will assume that the game ΓS has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i), and that
the ﬁrms’ best replies have a slope greater than −1.25 It is a well known result
that these conditions guarantee that ΓS has a unique equilibrium. Lemma 2
provides conditions under which the game ΓR also has a unique equilibrium.
Lemma 2: If n =2 , ΓR(U,w,qF) is a supermodular game, and the ﬁrms’ best
23Note that this result does not imply that all Nash equilibria of Γ(U,w,qF) are nonin-
creasing functions of qF. In fact we may have that a Nash equilibrium in the interior of the
set of Nash equilibria of Γ(U,w, ¯ qF) may be higher than the correspondent Nash equilibrium
in the interior of the set of Nash equilibria of Γ(U,w, ˆ qF) with ˆ qF higher than ¯ qF. Still, a
decrease in equilibrium output can be justiﬁed by a coordination argument since the smallest
Cournot-Nash equilibrium is the most preferred equilibrium for the ﬁrms whereas the largest
equilibrium is the less preferred one.
24In the smooth version of the n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly game with reciprocal ﬁrms the
condition that Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q F
−i) is equivalent to the requirement that
∂2Ui/∂qi∂QF







Since P0(Q) < 0 and Q−i > 0 the condition holds if ∂wi/∂QF
−i > 0.
25In the smooth version of the n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly game with selﬁsh ﬁrms these as-
sumptions are satisﬁed if the decreasing marginal revenue property holds, marginal cost is
increasing, and P0(Q) − C00
i (qi) < 0,i=1 ,...,n. Under these conditions the proﬁto fﬁrm i
is strictly concave in qi.This follows since ∂2πi/∂q2
i = P0(Q)+P00(Q)qi+P0(Q)−C00
i (qi) < 0.
We also have that ∂2πi/∂qi∂Q−i = P0(Q)+P00(Q)qi < 0. It also follows that the best reply








P0(Q)+P00(Q)qi + P0(Q) − C00
i (qi)
.
Theorem 2.8 in Vives (2001) shows that these conditions imply that the smooth version of
the n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly game with selﬁsh ﬁrms has a unique equilibrium.
10replies have a slope greater than −1, then there exists an unique equilibrium of
ΓR(U,w,qF).
This result guarantees that the supermodular Cournot game with reciprocal
ﬁrms has a unique equilibrium. The condition that drives the result is the
assumption that best replies have a slope strictly between (−1,0).26 We are now
ready to state the ﬁrst result that compares the outcome of Cournot competition
with reciprocal ﬁrms to that of Cournot competition with selﬁsh ﬁrms.
Proposition 1: If n =2 , ΓS(π) is a supermodular game such that the ﬁrms’
best replies have a slope greater than −1, ΓR(U,w,qF) is a supermodular game
such that
(i) Ui = πi + wi
P
j6=i πj,
(ii) Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q F
−i),
(iii) the ﬁrms’ best replies have a slope greater than −1, and
(iv) QF
−i = QNS
−i for all i,
then the Nash equilibrium of ΓS(π) coincides with that of ΓR(U,w,qF).
Proposition 1 says that if reciprocal ﬁrms perceive the fair output of its rivals
to be equal to the output that its rivals would produce in the equilibrium of
game with selﬁsh ﬁrms, then the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game with
reciprocal ﬁrms coincides with the Cournot-Nash equilibrium of the game with
selﬁsh ﬁrms. In this case market output, market price, consumer welfare, and
ﬁrms proﬁts are the same with reciprocal ﬁrms or with selﬁsh ﬁrms.27
26In the smooth version of the n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly game with reciprocal ﬁrms the



























¯ ¯ ¯ <
¯ ¯ ¯P0(Q) − C00(qi)+wi(Q−i,Q F
−i)P00 (Q)Q−i
¯ ¯ ¯.
This condition implies that the game has a unique equilibrium by Theorem 2.8 in Vives
(2001).
27It is possible that qNR 6= qNS but QNR = QNS, that is the equilibrium strategy proﬁle
of the Cournot game with reciprocal ﬁrms diﬀers from the equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the
Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms but the total output of each game is the same. This can
happen when some ﬁrms’ perception of fair aggregate output of its rivals is greater than the
expected aggregate output of its rivals in the Nash equilibrium of the game with selﬁsh ﬁrms
and other ﬁrms have the opposite perception. For example, consider a symmetry Cournot






j − qj), with i 6= j =1 ,2, and where ﬁrm 1
perceives that 4q2 = qF
2 − qNS
2 > 0, ﬁrm 2 perceives that 4q1 = qF
1 − qNS
1 < 0, and




2 but QNR = QNS. In
this case preferences for reciprocity change best replies, market shares, and proﬁts but do not
change total output, market price and consumer welfare.
11To clarify the intuition Proposition 1 we refer to the smooth n-ﬁrm Cournot
oligopoly game with reciprocal ﬁrms. In that game the best reply of ﬁrm i to
Q−i is implicitly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition
∂Ui
∂qi
= P(Q)+P0 (Q)qi − C0
i(qi)+wi(Q−i,Q F
−i)P0 (Q)Q−i =0 . (4)
It is straightforward to interpret this condition. The term P(Q)+P0 (Q)qi
represents marginal revenue and the term C0
i(qi) marginal cost. These two
terms represent the impact that a change in qi has on ﬁrm i’s material payoﬀ.28
T h en o v e l t yh e r ei st h et e r mwi(Q−i,Q F
−i)P0 (Q)Q−i. This term represents the
impact that a change in qi has on ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from preferences for reciprocity.
It follows from (4) that the best reply of a reciprocal ﬁrm i intercepts the best
reply of a selﬁsh ﬁrm i at Q−i = QF
−i. This happens because Q−i = QF
−i implies
wi(Q−i,Q F
−i)=0and (4) reduces to MRi = MCi. Thus, if marginal revenue
equals marginal cost for every ﬁrm, then market output as well as market price
are the same with reciprocal ﬁrms or with selﬁsh ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 tells us that a critical condition for the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium of the game with reciprocal ﬁrms to diﬀer from the Cournot-Nash equilib-
rium of the game with selﬁsh ﬁr m si st h a tr e c i p r o c a lﬁrms’ perceptions of the
fair output of its rivals are diﬀerent from the equilibrium output of its rivals of
the game with selﬁsh ﬁrms.
Next we state our second result about reciprocity and Cournot competition.
Proposition 2: If n =2 , ΓS(π) is a supermodular game such that the ﬁrms’
best replies have a slope greater than −1, ΓR(U,w,qF) is a supermodular game
such that
(i) Ui = πi + wi
P
j6=i πj,
(ii) Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q F
−i),
(iii) the ﬁrms’ best replies have a slope greater than −1, and
(iv) QF
−i >Q NS
−i for all i,
then the Nash equilibrium of ΓS(π) i sg r e a t e rt h a nt h a to fΓR(U,w,qF).
Proposition 2 tells us that if reciprocal ﬁrms perceive the fair output of their
rivals to be greater than the equilibrium output that the rivals would produce in
a game with selﬁsh ﬁrms, then ﬁrms will produce a smaller output in the game
with reciprocal ﬁrms than in the game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. This is the positive
reciprocity equilibrium. In such an equilibrium market output is smaller than
market output in the equilibrium of the Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. Thus,
consumers are worse oﬀ if reciprocal ﬁrms’ perceptions of fairness lead to a
positive reciprocity equilibrium than if ﬁrms were selﬁsh.
28In the smooth n-ﬁrm Cournot oligopoly game with selﬁsh ﬁrms the best reply of ﬁrm i
to Q−i is the unique solution to the ﬁrst-order condition
∂πi
∂qi
= P(Q)+P0 (Q)qi − C0
i(qi)=0 .
12I tf o l l o w sf r o m( 4 )t h a ti fﬁrm i expects its rivals to produce an equilibrium
output smaller than QF
−i,t h e nﬁrm i’s best reply is to produce a smaller amount
than the one it would produce if it was selﬁsh. This happens because if Q−i <
QF
−i, then ﬁrm i places a positive weight on its rivals material payoﬀ and this
implies that wi(Q−i,Q F
−i)P0 (Q)Q−i < 0. In this case, if ﬁrm i produces less
than its selﬁsh best reply to Q−i it has a ﬁrst-order gain in payoﬀ from positive
reciprocity (it increases the material payoﬀ of its opponents) and a second-order
loss in material payoﬀ (it reduces its own material payoﬀ). Firm i will reduce
production until the diﬀerence between marginal revenue and marginal cost
equals the marginal payoﬀ from positive reciprocity.
Next we state the “dual” result of Proposition 2.
Proposition 3: If n =2 , ΓS(π) is a supermodular game such that the ﬁrms’
best replies have a slope greater than −1, ΓR(U,w,qF) is a supermodular game
such that
(i) Ui = πi + wi
P
j6=i πj,
(ii) Ui has decreasing diﬀerences in (qi,Q F
−i),
(iii) the ﬁrms’ best replies have a slope greater than −1, and
(iv) QF
−i <Q NS
−i for all i,
then the Nash equilibrium of ΓS(π) is smaller than that of ΓR(U,w,qF).
This result tells us that if reciprocal ﬁrms perceive the fair output of their
rivals to be smaller than the equilibrium output that the rivals would produce
in a game with selﬁsh ﬁrms, then ﬁrms will produce a larger output in the game
with reciprocal ﬁr m st h a ni nt h eg a m ew i t hs e l ﬁsh ﬁrms. This is the negative
reciprocity equilibrium. In such an equilibrium market output is larger than
market output in the equilibrium of the Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. Thus,
consumers are better oﬀ if reciprocal ﬁrms’ perceptions of fairness lead to a
negative reciprocity equilibrium than if ﬁrms were selﬁsh.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 can also be illustrated by (4). If a re-
ciprocal ﬁrm i expects its rivals to produce an equilibrium output greater than
QF
−i, then ﬁrm i’s best reply is to produce a larger amount than the one it would
produce if it was selﬁsh. This happens because if Q−i >Q F
−i, then ﬁrm i places
a negative weight on its rivals material payoﬀ,t h a ti s ,wi(Q−i,Q F
−i) < 0.T h i si n
turn implies that wi(Q−i,Q F
−i)P0 (Q)Q−i > 0 since P0 (Q) < 0 and > 0. If this
is the case, then (4) is not satisﬁed if ﬁrm i would produce its selﬁsh best reply to
Q−i s i n c et h e nw ew o u l dh a v eMRi−MCi =0but wi(Q−i,Q F
−i)P0 (Q)Q−i > 0.
In fact, if ﬁrm i produces slightly more than its selﬁsh best reply to Q−i it has
a ﬁrst-order gain in payoﬀ from negative reciprocity (it reduces the material
payoﬀ of its opponents) and a second-order loss in material payoﬀ (it reduces
its own material payoﬀ). We see that (4) implies that ﬁrm i will increase pro-
duction until the diﬀerence between marginal revenue and marginal cost equals
the marginal payoﬀ from negative reciprocity.
134 Inequity Aversion
Another important type of non-selﬁsh preferences is inequity aversion. To study
the impact of inequity aversion on Cournot competition we assume that ﬁrm i’s
payoﬀ function is additively separable in the ﬁrm’s own material payoﬀ and the





where λij is a function that measures how diﬀerences in material payoﬀs between
ﬁrm j and ﬁrm i have an impact on the weight that ﬁrm i puts on ﬁrm j’s





> 0 if πj < πi
=0if πj = πi
< 0 otherwise
, (5)
that is, ﬁrm i places a positive weight on ﬁrm j’s material payoﬀ when j’s
material payoﬀ is smaller than that of ﬁrm i, ﬁrm i places no weight on j’s
material payoﬀ when ﬁrm j’s material payoﬀ equals that of ﬁrm i,a n dﬁrm i
places a negative weight on ﬁrm j’s material payoﬀ when j’s material payoﬀ is
greater than that of ﬁrm i.
These conditions capture the fact that an inequity averse ﬁrm cares about
the distribution of payoﬀs. The ﬁrst condition expresses advantageous inequity
or compassion. If ﬁrm i’s material payoﬀ is greater than that of ﬁrm j then
ﬁrm i is willing to sacriﬁce some of its own material payoﬀ to increase ﬁrm j’s
material payoﬀ. The last third condition expresses disadvantageous inequity or
envy. If ﬁrm i’s material payoﬀ is smaller than that of ﬁrm j then ﬁrm i is
w i l l i n gt os a c r i ﬁce some of its own material payoﬀ to reduce ﬁrm j’s material
payoﬀ.
The problem of ﬁrm i is to maximize its payoﬀ function taking the quantities
produced by the other ﬁrms as given and taking into consideration the impact






λij(πj(qi,Q −i) − πi(qi,Q −i)).
The best reply of an inequity averse ﬁrm i to Q−i is given by
ri(Q−i)=a r g qi maxπi(qi,Q −i)+
P
j6=i
λij(πj(qi,Q −i) − πi(qi,Q −i)).
We assume that the game is smooth and symmetric. Furthermore, we start our
analysis by assuming that λij is twice diﬀerentiable. If that is the case, then we




















29Neilson (2006) oﬀers a full axiomatic characterization of this payoﬀ function.
14where ∂πi/∂qi = P(Q)+P0 (Q)qi − C0
i(qi) and ∂πj/∂qi = P0 (Q)qj, for all
j 6= i. To guarantee that the ﬁrst-order condition is the solution to ﬁrm i’s the
problem we will assume that the payoﬀ function is strictly concave in qi.
Lemma 3: If



























¶¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
≤




¯ ¯ ¯ ¯,
(7)
then there exists an equilibrium of the symmetric n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot
game with inequity averse ﬁrms and the equilibrium is unique.
Condition (7) guarantees that the payoﬀ function of ﬁrm i is strictly concave
in qi. This guarantees existence of equilibrium. The assumption that the game
is symmetric together with condition (7) imply that the equilibrium is unique.
Let qNI =( qNI
1 ,...,qNI
n ) denote the Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the
n-ﬁrm Cournot game with inequity averse ﬁrms. We can now state the following
result.
Proposition 4: In the n-ﬁrm smooth and symmetric Cournot game with in-
equity averse ﬁrms if
(i) λij(πj − πi) satisﬁes (5) and λ
0
ij(0) = 0 for all i and j, then qNI = qNS;




ij(0) < 0 for all i, then qNI >q NS.
This result provides conditions under which diﬀerentiable speciﬁcations of
inequity aversion will or will not change the equilibrium outcome of smooth and
symmetric Cournot games. The result shows the main determinant of the impact
of inequity aversion on these type of games is the sign of the ﬁrst derivative of
the weighting function evaluated at the point where material payoﬀsa r ee q u a l . 30
If λ
0
ij(0) = 0, then the market output with inequity averse ﬁr m si se q u a lt ot h e




ij(0) < 0 for all i,t h e n
the market output with inequity averse ﬁrms is strictly greater than the market
output with selﬁsh ﬁrms.31
Proposition 4(i) shows that the equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the symmetric
Cournot game with inequity averse ﬁrms coincides with the equilibrium strategy
proﬁle of the symmetric Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms if the weighting function
30Assumption (5) and diﬀerentiability imply that λ0
ij(0) ≤ 0, that is, it can not be that
λ0
ij(0) > 0.
31It is hard to state general results that characterize the impact of inequity aversion on
Cournot competition for asymmetric games. In asymmetric games ﬁrms may have diﬀerent
costs of production or diﬀerent weight functions. If ﬁrms have diﬀerent costs, then the most
eﬃcient ﬁrms will produce more output and have higher proﬁts and the less eﬃcient ﬁrms
will produce less output and have lower proﬁts. This implies that the most eﬃcient ﬁrms
will fell compassion toward the less eﬃcient ﬁrms and the less eﬃcient ﬁrms will feel envy
toward the most eﬃcient ﬁrms. This may lead the most eﬃcient ﬁrms to produce less than
in a game with selﬁsh ﬁrms and the less eﬃcient ﬁrms to produce more. Thus, it is not clear
how aggregate output will change in an asymmetric Cournot oligopoly game when ﬁrms have
aversion to inequality in payoﬀs.
15satisﬁes condition (5) and λ
0
ij(0) = 0 for all i and j.32 The intuition behind this
result is as follows. The fact that the game is symmetric together with the
assumption that λ
0
ij(0) = 0, for all i and j, imply inequity aversion pivots the
best reply of each ﬁrm around the Nash equilibrium output of the Cournot
game with selﬁsh ﬁrms.33 This type of inequity aversion changes the best reply
functions of ﬁrms but does not change the equilibrium outcome of Cournot
competition.
Proposition 4(ii) shows that the equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the symmetric
Cournot game with inequity averse ﬁrms is greater than the equilibrium strategy
proﬁle of the symmetric Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms if the weighting function




ij(0) < 0 for all i.34 The fact that the game




ij(0) < 0 for all i imply
inequity aversion pivots the best reply of ﬁrm i pivots around the point qp ∈
rS












< 0.35 This type of inequity
aversion changes both the best reply functions of ﬁrms as well as the equilibrium
outcome of Cournot competition.
Bolton and Ockenfels’s (2000) were the ﬁrst to study the impact of inequity
aversion on equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets. Bolton and Ockenfels
ﬁnd that diﬀerentiable inequity aversion has no implications in terms of equi-
32For example, the weighting function
λij(πj − πi)=
½
−αij(πj − πi)2, if πj ≥ πi
αij(πj − πi)2, otherwise ,
with αij > 0, satisﬁes condition (5) λ0
ij(0) = 0 for all i and j.
33The way inequity aversion pivots best replies is identical to the way preferences for reci-
procity pivot best replies. Consider, without loss of generality, Cournot competition between
two ﬁrms. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 knows that ﬁrm 2 will produce a low output level (by com-
parison with the Nash equilibrium output level of the game with selﬁsh ﬁrms). If ﬁrm 1 feels
no compassion towards ﬁrm 2,t h e nﬁrm 1’s best reply is to produce rS
1 (q2). However, if ﬁrm
1 feels compassion towards ﬁrm 2, then producing rS
1 (q2) is no longer the optimal choice. By
producing somewhat less than rS
1 (q2) there is a second order loss in material payoﬀ for ﬁrm
1b u taﬁrst order gain in reduction of advantageous inequity. By contrast, if ﬁrm 1 knows
that ﬁrm 2 will produce a high output level and ﬁrm 1 feels no envy towards ﬁrm 2,t h e n
ﬁrm 1’s best reply is to produce rS
1 (q2).H o w e v e r , i f ﬁrm 1 feels envy towards ﬁrm 2, then
producing rS
1 (q2) is no longer the optimal choice. By producing somewhat more than rS
1 (q2)





(πj − πi)3 +( πj − πi)
¤
,
with αij > 0, satisﬁes condition (5) and λ0
ij(0) = −αij < 0.































ij(πj − πi)(qj − qi),
with λ0
ij(πj − πi) < 0 for all πj and πi. Since P(Q) − C0





ij(πj − πi)(qj − qi) < 0.
16librium outcomes in Cournot and Bertrand competition. According to Bolton









where the function v is assumed to be globally non-decreasing and concave in the
ﬁrst argument, to be strictly concave in the second argument (relative payoﬀ),
and to satisfy v2(πi,1/n)=0for all πi. Bolton and Ockenfels shows that this
type of inequity aversion has no impact on equilibrium outcomes in symmetric
Cournot games. Proposition 4 shows that Bolton and Ockenfels’s result is driven
by the assumption that v2(πi,1/n)=0for all πi.
We will now study the impact that Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) speciﬁcation
of inequity aversion has on equilibrium outcomes of Cournot competition.36 We
will show that this form of inequity aversion can change the strategic interac-
tion between ﬁrms’ choice variables. Recall that under the assumptions made
in this paper the n-ﬁrm smooth Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms has best reply
functions with a negative slope. This means that quantities are strategic sub-
stitutes. We will show that Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) speciﬁcation of inequity
aversion makes quantities become strategic complements over intermediate out-
put levels. We will also show that if players with this type of preferences play
Cournot games, then there can be a continuum of symmetric equilibria.


















T h et e r m si nt h es q u a r eb r a c k e ta r et h ep a y o ﬀ eﬀects of disadvantageous and
advantageous inequity, respectively. We see that if ﬁrm i’s material payoﬀ is
greater than the average material payoﬀ of its rivals then ﬁrm i feels compassion
t o w a r d si t sr i v a l s ,t h i si st h ea d v a n t a g e o u si n e q u i t yt e r m .H o w e v e r ,i fﬁrm i’s
material payoﬀ is smaller than the average material payoﬀ of its rivals then
ﬁrm i feels envy towards its rivals, this is the disadvantageous inequity term.37
We see that Fehr and Schmidt’s model of inequity aversion has piecewise linear
indiﬀerence curves over a ﬁrm’s own material payoﬀ and its rivals’ material
payoﬀs.
36This functional form of inequity aversion is widely used by the literature that studies the
impact of inequity aversion on economic models.
37When there are only two ﬁrms in the market ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ becomes
Ui(πi,πj)=πi − [αi max(πj − πi,0) + βi max(πi − πj,0)],i 6= j =1 ,2. (9)
Fehr and Schmidt assume that the dislike of disadvantageous inequity is stronger than that of
advantageous inequity, i.e. αi > βi and that βi is smaller than 1. We make no assumptions
about the relation between αi and βi but we assume, like Fehr and Schmidt, that βi is smaller
than 1.
17Thus, ﬁrm i’s degree of inequity aversion towards its rivals is characterized
by the pair of parameters (αi,βi),i=1 ,2,...,n.38 We say that ﬁrm i exhibits
strict inequality aversion when both αi and βi are strictly greater than zero.
We say that a ﬁrm is not averse to inequity when αi = βi =0 . In all other
cases we say that a ﬁrm is (weakly) averse to inequity. We assume that αi and
βi,i=1 ,...,n, are common knowledge. We let the vector β denote ﬁrms’
compassion degrees and we let the vector α denote ﬁrms’ degrees of envy. Our
next result characterizes a ﬁrm’s best response in the presence of piecewise linear
inequity aversion.
Proposition 5: The best reply of ﬁrm i, i =1 ,...,n,in the n-ﬁrm Cournot





si(Q−i), 0 ≤ 1
n−1Q−i ≤ q(βi)
1
n−1Q−i,q (βi) ≤ 1
n−1Q−i ≤ q(αi)









[P (Q)qj − Cj(qj)],





[P (Q)qj − Cj(qj)],
q(βi) is the solution to
(1 − βi)[P(nq) − C0
i(q)] + P0(nq)q =0 , (10)
and q(αi) is the solution to
(1 + αi)[P(nq) − C0
i(q)] + P0(nq)q =0 . (11)
Proposition 5 characterizes the impact of piecewise linear inequity aversion
on a ﬁrm’s optimal output choice for any output levels of its rivals. It tells us that
a ﬁrm’s best reply is continuous like in the standard Cournot game. However,
by contrast with the standard Cournot game, a ﬁrm’s best reply function in the
Cournot game with piecewise linear inequity aversion is no longer monotonic.
38Alternatively, we could have considered that ﬁrm i has diﬀerent feelings of compassion and
envy towards each competitor. In this case we would have two inequity aversion parameters
for each competitor per ﬁrm, that is, we would have αij and βij for i 6= j =1 ,...,n .W e
assume , like Ferh and Schmidt that ﬁrm i feels the same degree of envy and compassion
towards all competitors. This makes the analysis simpler.
18With piecewise linear inequity aversion the best reply has three diﬀerent
segments. When a ﬁrm’s rivals produce low output levels the best response of
a ﬁrm that feels inequity aversion has a negative slope and consists of a smaller
level of output than the output level that the ﬁrm would produce if she felt
no inequity aversion. When a ﬁrm’s rivals produce intermediate output levels
t h eb e s tr e s p o n s eo faﬁrm that feels inequity aversion has a positive slope and
consists in producing the average output level of the rivals. Finally, when a
ﬁrm’s rivals produce high output levels the best response of a ﬁrm that feels
inequity aversion has a negative slope and consists of a larger level of output
that the output level that the ﬁrm would produce if she felt no inequity aversion.
We can now ready to characterize the set of Nash equilibria of the n-ﬁrm
symmetric Cournot oligopoly game when ﬁrms are averse to inequity in the
sense of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). We do that in the next two results.
Proposition 6: T h eu n i q u eN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo ft h en - ﬁrm symmetric Cournot
game with selﬁsh ﬁrms is always an equilibrium of the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot
game with piecewise linear inequity averse ﬁrms.
Recall that, under the assumptions made, there is a unique equilibrium of the
symmetric Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. In that equilibrium ﬁrms produce
the same amount and the market price is between the perfectly competitive
market price and the monopoly price. Proposition 6 shows that the unique
Nash equilibrium of the Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁr m sa l w a y sb e l o n g st ot h e
set of equilibria of the Cournot game with piecewise linear inequity aversion.
Proposition 7: The set of Nash equilibria of the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot
game with piecewise linear inequity averse ﬁrms is given by
NIA = {(q1,...,q n):qi = qj, ∀i 6= j, and q(β) ≤ qi ≤ q(α),i =1 ,...,n},
(12)
where
q(β)=m a x[ q(β1),...,q(βn)],
and
q(α)=m i n[ q(α1),...,q(αn)].
Proposition 7 tells us that if all ﬁrms are strictly averse to inequity, then
there is a continuum of equilibria in the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot game with
inequity averse ﬁrms. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Con-
sider, without loss of generality, Cournot competition between two ﬁrms. If a
ﬁrm knows that the rival will produce the selﬁsh Cournot-Nash quantity and
the ﬁrm is averse to inequity, then its best reply is to produce also the selﬁsh
Cournot-Nash quantity. Producing an output diﬀerent from the selﬁsh Cournot-
Nash quantity reduces the ﬁrm’s material payoﬀ and increases inequity costs.
19Now, suppose that a ﬁrm knows that the rival will produce somewhat less than
the selﬁsh Cournot-Nash quantity. If the ﬁrm is averse to advantageous inequity,
then its best reply is to produce exactly the same quantity as the rival. Pro-
ducing a higher quantity than the rival increases the ﬁrm’s material payoﬀ by
less than the cost from advantageous inequity. Similarly, if a ﬁrm knows that
the rival will produce somewhat more than the selﬁsh Cournot-Nash quantity,
then its best reply is also to produce the same quantity as the rival. Producing
a lower quantity than the rival increases the ﬁrm’s material payoﬀ by less than
the cost from disadvantageous inequity.39
It follows that in some of the equilibria of the Cournot game with piecewise
linear inequity aversion, the market price is lower than the equilibrium market
price in the standard Cournot game whereas in other equilibria the market
price is higher. Thus, it is not clear whether piecewise linear inequity aversion
between ﬁrms is generally good or bad for consumers (or for ﬁrms).40 However,
we can state conditions under which piecewise linear inequity aversion is good
or bad for consumers and ﬁrms. To do that we look at the impact of changes
in the ﬁrms’ degree of compassion and of envy.
Proposition 8: The largest Nash equilibria of the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot
game with piecewise linear inequity averse ﬁr m si san o n d e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no f
α. The smallest Nash equilibria is a nonincreasing function of β.
This welfare result characterizes the impact of envy and compassion between
ﬁrms on the set of Nash equilibria of the Cournot game with piecewise linear
inequity averse ﬁrms. It tells us that there is a weak complementarity between
the ﬁrms’ degree of envy and their equilibrium output, that is, an increase in
envy between ﬁrms increases the market output produced in the largest Nash
equilibria of the Cournot model with inequity aversion. If that is the case, then
an increase in the degree of envy between ﬁrms is likely to reduce ﬁrms’ proﬁts
and increase consumer surplus.
On the other hand, Proposition 8 tells us that an increase in compassion
between ﬁrms reduces the market output produced in the smallest Nash equi-
libria of the Cournot model with inequity aversion. If that is the case, then an
increase in the degree of compassion between ﬁr m si sl i k e l yt oi n c r e a s eﬁrms’
proﬁts and decrease consumer surplus. This result is quite intuitive. In fact,
Fehr and Schmidt’s payoﬀ function implies that if ﬁrm i has a higher monetary
payoﬀ than the average payoﬀ of her opponents and βi =1 /2, then ﬁrm i is
just as willing to keep one dollar to herself as to give it to her rivals. Now,
39The paper shows that a necessary condition for the continuum of equilibria to exist is
that the game is not too asymmetric. In fact, when there are large cost asymmetries between
ﬁrms the result no longer holds and there is a unique asymmetric equilibrium.
40Proposition 8 also shows that if there is at least one ﬁrm that is not averse to inequity, then
there is a unique equilibrium of the symmetric Cournot game with piecewise linear inequity
aversion: the equilibrium of the symmetric Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. This point
has been made before in papers that study the implications of interdependent preferences in
ultimatum games and in papers that look at nonselﬁsh preferences in perfectly competitive
markets. See Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), and Segal and Sobel
(2004).
20suppose that all ﬁrms have the same preferences as ﬁrm i. In this case ﬁrms are
acting as if they are maximizing their joint proﬁt,
P
πi. So, if βi =1 /2, with
i =1 ,...,n,then compassion leads to the collusive outcome.
The next result studies the implications of an increase in the number of ﬁrms
when there is quantity competition in markets where ﬁrms have piecewise linear
inequity aversion. To state this result we assume that αi and βi,i=1 ,...,n,
are drawn from a uniform distribution with support on [0,1].
Proposition 9: As the number of ﬁrms increases the set of Nash equilibria of
the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot game with piecewise linear inequity averse ﬁrms
converges to the unique Nash equilibrium of n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot game
with selﬁsh ﬁrms.
This result shows that increasing the number of ﬁrms reduces the impact
of piecewise linear inequity aversion on the set of Nash equilibria of the n-ﬁrm
Cournot game. This happens because when there are n ﬁrms, the smallest Nash
equilibria of the game is determined by the ﬁrm that has the lowest degree of
compassion. Similarly, the largest Nash equilibria of the game is determined by
the ﬁrm with the lowest degree of envy.41 If the degree of compassion and of
envy of each ﬁrm are drawn from a uniform distribution with support on [0,1],
then an increase in the number of ﬁrms makes it more likely that the lowest
level of compassion is very close to zero and that the lowest level of envy is very
close to zero. Thus, as the number of ﬁrms increases the smallest and the largest
Nash equilibria of the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot game with inequity aversion
converge to the Nash equilibrium of the standard n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot
game.42
5 Bertrand Competition
In the standard model of Bertrand competition ﬁrms select independently the
price for the product and every ﬁrm has the commitment to supply whatever
demand is forthcoming at the price it sets. Demand is strictly downward-sloping
when positive, cutting both axes, and ﬁrms have increasing cost functions Ci(qi).
Firms that set the lowest price split the demand and the remaining ﬁrms do not
sell anything. That is, given a vector of prices (pi)i∈N the sales of ﬁrm i are
qi =
½ D(pi)
l , if pj ≥ pi,∀j ∈ N
0, otherwise
,
where l =#{j ∈ N : pj = pi}.
It is a well know result that equilibrium outcomes of Bertrand competition
depend on the shape of the cost function. Therefore, we will analyze the impact
41T h es a m ei n t u i t i o ni sp r e s e n ti nt h eﬁrst model in Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
42Huck et al. (2004) review of the evidence on experimental Cournot markets. They ﬁnd
that evidence from experimental Cournot games shows that when there are only two ﬁrms in
the market collusive outcomes are frequent. However, as the number of ﬁrms increases output
approaches the Nash-equilibrium.
21of non-selﬁsh preferences on Bertrand competition for diﬀerent types of cost
function.
5.1 Constant Marginal Costs
It is a well know result that if ﬁrms are selﬁsh, marginal costs are constant and
identical, then the only equilibrium is one where all ﬁrms set price equal to
marginal cost, have zero proﬁts, and split the market demand equally. Our
next result characterizes the equilibrium of the n-ﬁrm symmetric Bertrand
game when ﬁrms have piecewise linear inequity aversion and constant marginal
costs.43
Proposition 10: The set of Nash equilibria of the n-ﬁrm symmetric Bertrand




a, if 1 − 1
n ≤ min(β1,...,βn)
c, otherwise ,
where a ∈ (c, ¯ p], with ¯ p being the choke-oﬀ price for demand.
This result shows that if marginal cost are constant and there is at least one
ﬁrm with a degree of compassion smaller than 1−1/n, then the only equilibrium
is for all ﬁrms to charge price equal to marginal cost. By contrast, if marginal
costs are constant and all ﬁrms have a degree of compassion greater than 1−1/n,
then there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria where ﬁrms charge a price
between marginal cost and the price that leads to zero market demand.
There are two interpretations for Proposition 10. For a ﬁxed number of
ﬁrms, this result tells us that piecewise linear inequity aversion can only raise
price above marginal cost in Bertrand competition between ﬁrms with constant
marginal costs when all ﬁrms have a very high level of compassion.44 For a ﬁxed
level of compassion, say β, with β ∈ (1/2,1), this result tells us that an increase
in the number of ﬁrms makes it is harder for piecewise linear inequity aversion
to lead ﬁrms to set price above marginal cost. Of course, if we assume that βi,
i =1 ,...,n, has a uniform distribution on [0,1],t h e na ni n c r e a s ei nn raises
1 − 1
n and reduces min(β1,...,βn) which makes it even harder to satisfy the
condition that allows ﬁrms to charge price above marginal cost.
5.2 Decreasing Returns
Dastidar (1995) shows that in symmetric Bertrand competition between ﬁrms
with increasing marginal costs (decreasing returns), there is a continuum of
symmetric equilibria where ﬁrms set a price in the interval [pL,p H], and this
interval contains the perfectly competitive price. To study Bertrand competition
43The ﬁndings with reciprocity and other forms of inequity aversion are similar.
44Recall that if β =1 /2 implies that a ﬁrm is just indiﬀerent between keeping one dollar to
heself and giving this dollar to her competitors.
22with decreasing returns, n ﬁrms, and piecewise linear inequity aversion, we make
two simplifying assumptions. We take demand to be linear—D(p)=a − bp—and
we assume that ﬁrms’ costs are given by Ci(qi)=cq2











and the perfectly competitive price is given by p = ac/(n+bc).45 Our next result
states the impact of piecewise linear inequity aversion on the n-ﬁrm symmetric
Bertrand game with linear demand and quadratic costs.
Proposition 11: The set of Nash equilibria of the n-ﬁrm symmetric Bertrand
game with piecewise linear inequity averse ﬁrms, linear demand, and quadratic







L is equal to (13) and
pIA




2(1− n−1 − βi)(1− n−2 − βi)
−1 + bc
,i =1 ,...,n, (14)
and with βi ≤ 1/2,i=1 ,...,n.
Proposition 11 tells us that piecewise linear inequity aversion between ﬁrms
may lead to a higher range of equilibrium prices when there is Bertrand compe-
tition and ﬁrms have increasing marginal costs. This happens because the upper
bound of the equilibrium price interval in the Bertrand game with piecewise lin-
ear inequity aversion is greater than the upper bound of the equilibrium price
interval in the Bertrand game with selﬁsh ﬁrms whereas the lower bound stays
the same.46 Dastidar (1995) shows that the upper bound price is determined by
a condition that makes a ﬁrm indiﬀerent between playing the symmetric equi-
librium and being the single producer in the market. The fact that a ﬁrm feels
compassion for other ﬁrms reduces the payoﬀ of being the single producer in
the market and does not change a ﬁrm’s proﬁtw h e na l lﬁrms are in the market.
This implies that it is possible to have a larger range of higher prices in the
symmetric equilibrium.
However, as we can see, the conditions for this to happen are quite restric-
tive. Like in the n-ﬁrm Cournot model with piecewise linear inequity aversion,
45See Vives (2001).
46Since βi belongs to [0,1/2] for i =1 ,...,n, it follows that the denominator in (14) is
smaller than the denominator in (13). If that is the case, then pH(βi) >p H, for all i.I f
that is the case then pIA
H >p H, that is, the upper bound of the equilibrium price interval in
the Bertrand game with inequity aversion is greater than the upper bound of the equilibrium
price interval in the Bertrand game without inequity aversion.
23increasing the number of ﬁrms in the n-ﬁrm Bertrand game with increasing
marginal costs reduces the impact of piecewise linear inequity aversion on the
set of equilibria.47 Furthermore, like in the n-ﬁrm Cournot model, it is enough
for one ﬁrm to be selﬁsh for the eﬀect to go away.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper studies the impact of non-selﬁsh preferences among ﬁrms on quantity
and price competition in oligopolistic markets. The paper focuses on reciprocity
and inequity aversion since there are the two forms of non-selﬁsh preferences that
are more often found in experiments. The results obtained show that: (1) reci-
procity and inequity aversion can be beneﬁcial or harmful for consumers and
ﬁrms, (2) reciprocity and inequity aversion have a larger impact on equilibrium
outcomes of oligopolistic markets with a small number of ﬁrms, and (3) reci-
procity and inequity aversion have a larger impact on equilibrium outcomes of
Cournot competition than on equilibrium outcomes of Bertrand competition.
As it was mentioned in the introduction, this paper is a ﬁrst step towards
understanding the impact that non-selﬁsh preferences have on oligopolistic mar-
kets. Our starting point was that ﬁrms only feel reciprocity or inequity aversion
concerns among themselves. A natural extension of this paper would be to
consider that ﬁrms’ preferences also include consumers’ welfare. It can also be
interesting to ﬁnd out what happens to market outcomes when some ﬁrms ap-
peal to consumers’ fairness concerns.48 It is well known that in certain markets
some ﬁrms donate a large share of their proﬁts for charitable purposes while
others do not.49 It would be fruitful to explore the implications of these and
related phenomena on equilibrium outcomes in oligopolistic markets.
47If one assumes that βi is drawn from a uniform distribution on [0,1/2], then an increase
in n makes it more likely that min(β1,...,βn) is close to zero, which in turn implies that it
is more likely that pIA
H is close to pH.
48Rabin (1993) considers a market where consumers perceive the price charged by a monop-
olist as unfair. He ﬁnds that the highest fairness equilibrium price is lower than the standard
monopoly price.
49One of the most famous examples being Paul Newman’s brand Newman’s Own, Inc. which
has given more than $175 million.dollars to thousands of charities since 1982.
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257A p p e n d i x
Proof of Lemma 1: [Incomplete] The assumption that Ui has decreasing
diﬀerences in (qi,Q −i) implies that all the conditions required for ΓR(U,w,qF)
to be a supermodular game are satisﬁed. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 : Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : Theorem 2.8 in Vives (2001). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 : We know by Lemma 2 that if the slope of the best
r e p l i e si sg r e a t e rt h a n−1, then there is a unique equilibrium of the supermodular
Cournot game with reciprocal ﬁrms. Let qNR =( qNR
1 ,...,qNR
n ) denote the
Nash equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the n-ﬁrm Cournot game with ﬁrms that
have preferences for reciprocity. Let qNS =( qNS
1 ,...,qNS
n ) denote the Nash
equilibrium strategy proﬁle of the n-ﬁrm Cournot game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. We
wish to show that if QF
−i = QNS
−i , then qNR
i = qNS
i , with i =1 ,...,n,. To do
that we only need show that a reciprocal ﬁrm i has no incentive to deviate from
qNR
i = qNS







−i then wi(Q−i,Q F
−i)=0 . If that is the case, the best response of ﬁrm i to
QNR
−i is indeed qNR
i = qNS
i . Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 : The assumptions made on πi imply that ΓS(π) has a
unique equilibrium. The assumptions made on Ui together with Lemma 2 imply
that ΓR(U,w,qF) also has a unique equilibrium. We know from Proposition 1
that if ˆ qF = qNS, then qNR = qNS. If ˜ qF > ˆ qF = qNS, then Theorem 1 implies
that the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium of ΓR(U,w, ˜ qF) is smaller than the
unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium of ΓR(U,w, ˆ qF) Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : The assumptions made on πi imply that ΓS(π) has a
unique equilibrium. The assumptions made on Ui together with Lemma 2 imply
that ΓR(U,w,qF) also has a unique equilibrium. We know from Proposition 1
that if ˆ qF = qNS, then qNR = qNS. If ˜ qF < ˆ qF = qNS, then Theorem 1 implies
that the unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium of ΓR(U,w, ˜ qF) is greater than the
unique Cournot-Nash equilibrium of ΓR(U,w, ˆ qF). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 : To prove existence of equilibrium we only need to show
that condition (??) implies that the payoﬀ function of ﬁrm i is strictly concave






































i =2 P0(Q)+P00 (Q)qi − C00(qi) and ∂2πj/∂q2
i = P00 (Q)qj, for
all j 6= i. Firm i’s payoﬀ function is strictly concave in qi if ∂2Ui/∂q2
i < 0.I ti s
easy to check that condition (??) implies that ∂2Ui/∂q2
i < 0. The assumption
that the game is symmetric implies that there is a unique equilibrium. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 : The symmetry assumption implies that qi = qj,f o r
all i 6= j, and this implies that πi = πj, for all i 6= j. If that is the case, then

























¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qi=qj
= P0(Q)qj − [P0(Q)qi + P(Q) − C0(qi)]|qi=qj
= −[P(Q) − C0(qi)]. (15)
Using (15) the ﬁrst-order condition becomes
∂Ui
∂qi












ij(0) = 0 for all i and j, then (16) reduces to ∂πi/∂qi =0and this implies

















ij(0) > 1 in (16) together with P(Q) − C0(qi) > 0 and P0(Q) < 0






ij(0) < 0 for all i. The assumption that marginal
revenue is decreasing, that C00







i < 0. This in turn implies that qNI >q NS. This proves
part (ii). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5 : To prove this result we will start by showing that
q(αi) is an increasing function of αi and that q(βi) is a decreasing function of
βi for i =1 ,...,n.From (11) we have
h(q,αi)=( 1+αi)[P(nq) − C0










(1 + n(1 + αi))P0(Q)+nP00(Q)q − C00
i (q)
> 0,
27s i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tP0(Q) < 0,P 0(Q) ≤ 0, and C00
i (qi) ≥ 0. From (10)
we have
g(q,βi)=( 1− βi)[P(nq) − C0










(1 + n(1 − βi))P0(Q)+nP00(Q)q − C00
i (q)
< 0,
s i n c ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tP0(Q) < 0,P 0(Q) ≤ 0, and C00
i (qi) ≥ 0.
W ew i l ln o ws h o wt h a tqi = 1
n−1
P
j6=i qj is a best response for ﬁrm i when the
rivals produce
qN
i ≤ ¯ qj ≤ q(αi), (17)
where ¯ qj = 1
n−1
P
j6=i qj. To do that we will show that ﬁrm i can not gain from
deviating from qi =¯ qj when (17) holds. Suppose, that (17) holds and that ﬁrm
i produces qi =¯ qj + ε, with ε > 0. In this case ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ is given by





[P (Q)qj − Cj(qj)]
and the change in ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from producing qi =¯ qj + ε, ε > 0, instead of
¯ qj is approximately equal to







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qi=¯ qj
(ε)
=[ ( P0 (n¯ qj)¯ qj + P(n¯ qj) − C0
i(¯ qj)) − βi (P(n¯ qj) − C0
i(¯ qj))]ε.
The square brackets are negative since qi =¯ qj > argmax[P (Q)qi − Ci(qi)] and
P(n¯ qj)−C0
i(¯ qj) > 0. So, when (17) holds, ﬁrm i can not gain by producing more
than ¯ qj. Now, suppose that (17) holds and that ﬁrm i produces qi =¯ qj +ε, with
ε < 0. In this case ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ is given by





[P (Q)qj − Cj(qj)],
and the change in ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from producing qi =¯ qj + ε, ε < 0, instead of
¯ qj is approximately equal to







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qi=¯ qj
(ε)
=[ ( 1 + αi)[P(n¯ qj) − C0
i(¯ qj)] + P0(n¯ qj)¯ qj]ε
= h(q,αi)|q=¯ qj (ε).
28Since ε < 0,w eh a v et h a tsign dUi = −sign h(q,αi)|q=¯ qj . If ¯ qj = q(αi) we have
that sign dUi =0 . If qN
i ≤ ¯ qj <q (αi), the fact h(q,αi) is a decreasing function
of q implies that h(q,αi)|q=¯ qj > 0, which in turn implies that sign dUi < 0. So,
when (17) holds, ﬁrm i can not gain by producing less than ¯ qj. From this result




the best response of ﬁrm i is given by ti(q−i).
W ew i l ln o ws h o wt h a tqi = 1
n−1
P
j6=i qj is a best response for ﬁrm i when the
rivals produce
q(βi) ≤ ¯ qj ≤ qN
i , (18)
To do that we will show that ﬁrm i can not gain from deviating from qi =¯ qj
when (18) holds. Suppose, that (18) holds and that ﬁrm i produces qi =¯ qj +ε,
with ε < 0. In this case ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ is given by





[P (Q)qj − Cj(qj)],
and the change in ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from producing qi =¯ qj + ε, ε < 0, instead of
¯ qj is approximately equal to







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qi=¯ qj
(ε)
=[ ( 1 + αi)[P0(n¯ qj)¯ qj + P(n¯ qj) − C0
i(¯ qj)] − αiP0(n¯ qj)¯ qj]ε.
T h es q u a r eb r a c k e t sa r ep o s i t i v es i n c eqi =¯ qj < argmax[P (Q)qi − Ci(qi)] and
P0(n¯ qj) < 0. So, when (18) holds, ﬁrm i can not gain by producing less than ¯ qj.
Now, suppose that (18) holds and that ﬁrm i produces qi =¯ qj + ε, with ε > 0.
In this case ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ is given by





[P (Q)qj − Cj(qj)]
and the change in ﬁrm i’s payoﬀ from producing qi =¯ qj + ε, ε > 0, instead of
¯ qj is approximately equal to







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
qi=¯ qj
(ε)
=[ ( 1 − βi)[P(n¯ qj) − C0
i(¯ qj)] + P0 (n¯ qj)¯ qj]ε
= g(q,βi)|q=¯ qj (ε).
Since ε > 0, we have that sign dUi = sign g(q,βi)|q=¯ qj . If ¯ qj = q(βi) we have
that sign dUi =0 . If q(βi) < ¯ qj ≤ qN
i , the fact g(q,βi) is a decreasing function
of q implies that g(q,βi)|q=¯ qj < 0, w h i c hi nt u r ni m p l i e st h a tsign dUi < 0. So,
29when (18) holds, ﬁrm i can not gain by producing more than ¯ qj. From this result
is follows immediately that if ﬁrm i’s rivals produce 0 ≤ 1
n−1
P
j6=i qj <q (βi),
then the best response of ﬁrm i is given by si(q−i). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n6 :W e w i s h t o s h o w t h a t qi = qN










in the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot
game with piecewise linear inequity averse ﬁrms. The welfare of ﬁrm 1 un-

























If ﬁrm i produces qN
i +ε, with ε > 0, and all other ﬁrms produce qN
−i, then the
change in ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is approximately equal to


















The assumption that P0 < 0,P 00 ≤ 0, and C00 ≥ 0 imply that dπi < 0. The
change in the proﬁti no n eo fﬁrm i’s rivals, say ﬁrm j,i sa p p r o x i m a t e l ye q u a l
to















Note that the change in the average proﬁto fﬁrm i’s rivals is the same as the


























The assumption that P0 < 0 and P00 ≤ 0 imply that 1
n−1
P
j6=i dπj < 0. We see
from (19) and (20) that if ﬁrm i produces qN
i +ε, with ε > 0, and all other ﬁrms
produce qN
−i, then there is a ﬁrst order decrease in proﬁts of ﬁrm i and a second
order decrease in the average proﬁto fﬁrm i’s rivals. Thus, if ﬁrm i produces
qN
i + ε, with ε > 0, it suﬀers a loss in proﬁts and also a loss from an increase
in inequity aversion given that the average proﬁt of the rivals becomes smaller
than ﬁrm i’s proﬁt. If that is the case, then ﬁrm i can not gain by producing
qN
i + ε, with ε > 0, instead of producing qN
i .
If ﬁrm i produces qN
i + ε, with ε < 0, and all other ﬁrms produce qN
−i, then
the change in ﬁrm i’s proﬁt is given by (19) and we have that dπi < 0. The




j6=i dπj > 0 since ε < 0 and the ﬁrst term is of ﬁrst order while the
second term is of second order. Thus, if ﬁrm i produces qN
i + ε, with ε < 0,
30it suﬀers a loss in proﬁts and also a loss from an increase in inequity aversion
given that the average proﬁt of the rivals becomes greater than ﬁrm i’s proﬁt.
If that is the case, then ﬁrm i can not gain by producing qN
i + ε, with ε < 0,
instead of producing qN
i . This proves that qi = qN










in the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot game with
piecewise linear inequity averse ﬁrms. But, this in turn implies that qN is a
Nash equilibrium of the n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot game with piecewise linear
inequity averse ﬁrms. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n7 : We know that the set NIA is non-empty since it
contains at least the Nash equilibrium of the standard n-ﬁrm symmetric Cournot
game. We will now show that if all ﬁrms display strict inequity aversion, then
q(β) <q (α), that is, NIA is an interval. We know that q(αi) is an increasing
function of αi and that q(βi) is a decreasing function of βi for i =1 ,...,n.It is
obvious that if at least one ﬁrm does not feel inequity aversion then q(β)=q(α),
and NIA is a singleton. To see this suppose that ﬁrm i does not feel inequity
aversion, that is, αi = βi =0 . If this is the case, then (10) and (11) imply
that q(0) = qN. If q(αi) is an increasing function of αi and q(0) = qN, then
q(α)=qN. Similarly, if q(βi) is a decreasing function of βi and q(0) = qN, then
q(β)=qN. So, if at least one ﬁrm does feel inequity aversion we have that q(β)=
q(α)=qN = NIA. We will now show that if all ﬁrms display strict inequity
aversion, then q(β) <q (α), that is, NIA is an interval. If all ﬁrms display strict
inequity aversion, q(αi) is an increasing function of αi and q(0) = qN, then
q(α) >q N = q(0). Also, if all ﬁrms display strict inequity aversion, q(αi) is an
decreasing function of βi and q(0) = qN, then q(β) <q N = q(0). This shows
that q(β) <q (α) when all ﬁrms display strict inequity aversion, that is the set
NIA is an interval. All outcomes in the set NIA are equilibria of the symmetric
Cournot game with inequity aversion since for any proﬁle of quantities, q−i, the
quantity qi belongs to the best response of ﬁrm i, i =1 ,...n. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 : The quantity produced by each ﬁrm in the largest
Nash equilibria of NIA is given by q(α)=m i n[ q(α1),...,q(αn)]. The largest
Nash equilibria of NIA is nondecreasing in α since min[q(α1),...,q(αn)] is
nondecreasing in α. Similarly, the quantity produced by each ﬁrm in the smallest
Nash equilibria of NIA is given by q(β)=m a x[ q(β1),...,q(βn)]. The smallest
Nash equilibria of NIA is nonincreasing in β since max[q(β1),...,q(βn)] is
nonincreasing in β. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n9 :W h e na l lﬁrms feel strict inequity aversion it follows
that q(β) <q N <q (α). Since αi is drawn from a uniform distribution with
support on [0,1], the larger is n the most likely it becomes that min(α1,...αn) is
closer to zero, this in turn implies that the larger is n the most likely is that N(α)
is closer to qN. Similarly, since βi is drawn from a uniform distribution with
support on [0,1], the larger is n the most likely it becomes that min(β1,...,βn)
31is closer to zero, this in turn implies that the larger is n the most likely is that
N(β) is closer to qN. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0 : If marginal costs are constant, then we have
Ci(qi)=cqi,i=1 ,...,n.T h e p a y o ﬀ of ﬁrm i in the presence of piecewise





(1 − βi)(pi − c)D(pi), if pi <p min
j ³
















j =m i n( p1,...,p i−1,p i+1,...,p n) and l =#{j ∈ N : pj = pi}. For
ﬁrm i not to deviate from an equilibrium where ﬁrm i plus l −1 ﬁrms charge a
price p ∈ (c, ¯ p] and the remaining ﬁrms charge a higher price than p it must be
that
(1 − βi)(pi − c)D(pi) ≤
µ





















If this condition does not hold, then there is at least one ﬁrm that is always
willing to undercut a price p ∈ (c, ¯ p]. If that is the case, then the only equilibrium
is for all ﬁrms to charge price equal to marginal cost. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 1 :I f a l l ﬁrms produce in the market and all charge the
same price the payoﬀ of each ﬁrm is given by πn(p)=pD(p)/n − C(D(p)/n).
If demand is D(p)=a − bp and C(q)=cq2/2 we have that πn(p)=p(a −
bp)/n − c(a − bp)2/2n2. Dastidar (1995) shows that the lower bound of the
set of equilibrium prices, pL, is given by the solution to πn(p)=0 . In this
case, our assumptions imply that pL = ac/(2n + b). If a ﬁrm is the single
producer in the market, then all the other ﬁrms must have zero proﬁta n d
therefore the proﬁt of the single producer is given by π1(p)=pD(p)−C(D(p)).
However, with inequity aversion, the payoﬀ of this ﬁrm is given by Ui(p)=
32(1−βi)π1(p). If demand is D(p)=a−bp and C(q)=cq2/2 we have that Ui(p)=
(1 − βi)
£
p(a − bp) − c(a − bp)2/2
¤
. Applying Dastidar (1995) to our model with
inequity aversion, we have that the upper bound of the set of equilibrium prices
with inequity aversion, pH, is the given by (14), where pH(βi) solution to Ui(p)=
πn(p). That is, pH(βi) is the solution to
(1 − βi)
£
p(a − bp) − c(a − bp)2/2
¤
= p(a − bp)/n − c(a − bp)2/2n2.




n2 − 1 − βin2¢
2(n2 − n − βin2)+bc(n2 − 1 − βn2)
=
ac




2(1− n−1 − βi)(1− n−2 − βi)
−1 + bc
.
Q.E.D.
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